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Abstract 
The tax smoothing hypothesis (TSH) is tested for the New Member States of the European Union. Our results show 
that the TSH holds for five countries, the introduction of the Maastricht 3%-deficit rule, however, had very little effect 
with regard to the validity of the TSH.
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1 Introduction
As of May 2004 the European Union (EU) has been enlarged by ten Eastern European
countries, as of January 2007 by two more. With entry into the EU, these New Member
States (NMS) became subject to the Maastricht Treaty, which comprises two ﬁscal criteria,
namely government deﬁcit (debt), as a percentage of GDP, must not be higher than 3%
(60%). The tax smoothing hypothesis (TSH), based on the premise that governments smooth
tax rates over time in order to minimize the implied distortionary welfare costs from taxation,
states that future expectations of changes in government expenditure determine whether it
is optimal to run either budget surpluses or deﬁcits. This raises the question whether the
Maastricht ﬁscal rule inhibited tax smoothing such that the NMS were not able to let deﬁcits
grow as much as implied by expected decreases in government expenditure.
Empirical evidence following the seminal paper by Barro (1979) is relatively mixed, with
some papers rejecting the TSH (Huang and Lin, 1993, for the US; Olekalns and Crosby,
1998, for Australia and the UK, Cashin et al., 1999, for Sri Lanka) and others which cannot
reject the TSH (Ghosh, 1995, for Canada and the US, Olekalns and Crosby, 1998 for the
US; Cashin et al., 1998, 1999, for Pakistan and India). As far as the evidence for Europe
is concerned, the only paper, to the knowledge of the authors, is the one by Adler (2006),
which tests the TSH for Sweden.
The focus of this paper is on the investigation of the validity of the TSH for the NMS and
the existence of a structural break which may have occurred due to the introduction of the
3%-deﬁcit rule. Thus we want to evaluate whether this ﬁscal rule has indeed prevented
countries from smoothing taxes.
2 The theoretical model
In testing the basic premises of the TSH we closely follow Ghosh (1995), Olekalns (1997)
and Adler (2006). Postulating that output grows at a ﬁxed rate equal to n, the dynamic
government budget constraint is represented by
(1 + n)dt+1 = (1 + r)dt + gt − τt (1)
where dt is government debt; gt is government expenditure; τt is government tax receipts
(all expressed as ratio to output) and r is the (ﬁxed) real interest rate. Substituting (1)
forward and imposing the transversality condition gives the intertemporal budget constraint
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Etgj + (1 + r)dt (2)
where j is the index variable for time, R = (r−n)/(1+n) is the eﬀective net interest rate faced
by the government, and Et is the expectations operator, conditional on the government’s
information set at time t.











t is total government expenditure, i.e. the sum of current expenditure, gt, and
eﬀective interest payment on government debt. According to (3), optimal budget policy
requires that the budget balance must always be equal to the discounted sum of all future
expected changes in government expenditure.
Besides tax smoothing, there is another motivation to run budget deﬁcits, namely tax tilting
(see Ghosh, 1995, Cashin et al, 1998, 1999). The main reason for tax tilting is that the
government’s discount rate, β, diﬀers from the eﬀective interest rate, R, i.e. tax tilting
creates a tendency towards either deﬁcits or surpluses. Thus, it is essential that the optimal
balance given by (3) refers only to the budget component that relates to tax smoothing. This
can be achieved by ﬁltering the tax tilting component from the budget balance according to
balsm
t = γ−1τt − (gt + (r − n)dt) = γ−1τt − gtot
t (4)
where γ = [(1 −(R/β)R)/(1 −R)] is the tilting parameter. Given that τt and gtot
t are I(1),
γ−1 is the cointegrating parameter from the regression of gtot
t on τt.
In order to derive the optimal budget balance (equation (3)), a measure of anticipated fu-
ture changes of government expenditure is needed. Following Campbell (1987) and Campbell
and Shiller (1987), under the null hypothesis that tax smoothing holds, the budget balance
contains all information about future changes in government expenditure, hence the former
should Granger-cause the latter. Since balsm
t responds to expected future changes in govern-
ment expenditure, it is a relevant information variable in forecasting the latter. Thus, this
forecast can be obtained from a bivariate autoregressive model of △gtot
t and balsm
t . Hence,
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or, rewriting (5) in matrix form
Xt = AXt−1 + εt (6)
where A is a 2×2 matrix of coeﬃcients and Xt = (△gtot
t ,balsm
t ). The forecast of a one-period


































t = ΛXt (8)
If the TSH is true, the predicted budget balance, ￿ bal
ts
t , is equal to balsm
t , i.e., Λ1 = 0 and




















Our ﬁrst goal is to verify that τt and gtot
t are I(1) and cointegrated such that τ−gtot
t = balsm
t
is I(0). Table 1 displays results from the Dickey—Fuller tests; the null of a unit root of τt
and gtot
t cannot be rejected except for Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia which will
hence be excluded from the subsequent analysis.
Insert Table 1 around here
The next step is to obtain an estimate of the tilting parameter γ−1 as described above.
Given that gtot
t and τt are I(1), this should be done using the Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully
1The data source for all time series used here is the AMECO database of the European Commission. We
use quartely data for the NMS from 1998:4-2007:3.
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modiﬁed OLS (FM-OLS) method, which yields an asymptotically correct variance-covariance
estimator in the presence of serial correlation and endogeneity; balsm
t is then given by the
residuals of the FM-OLS estimation of (4).2 As to the DF-test of balsm
t , the null of a unit
root can be rejected for all countries except for Malta and Slovenia.
The results from the Granger-causality tests (Table 1, column 7) show that the null (i.e.
balsm
t−1 non-Granger causes △gtot
t ) can be rejected for all countries except for Latvia and
Malta. Hence, the DF- and Granger-causality tests imply that for Latvia and Malta as well
as Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia the data is not consistent with the most basic
implications of tax-smoothing behaviour.
Insert Table 2 around here
Based on the results from the VAR-estimation3 the Λ1- and Λ2-parameters and ￿ bal
ts
t were
calculated (see Table 2). The Wald tests for the restrictions set out in (9) show that the null
of tax smoothing cannot be rejected for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland
and Romania, which is also conﬁrmed when graphically comparing balsm
t to the predicted
budget balance ￿ bal
ts
t (Figure 1), where it can be seen that the two time series correspond
quite closely. Interestingly, three of these countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) had
deﬁcits over 3% between 2004 and 2007 which could imply that for these countries smoothing
taxes was more important than being subject to the Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure.
Insert Figure 1 around here
As already mentioned, there might be the possibility that the introduction of the Maastricht
deﬁcit rule has prohibited countries from tax smoothing. This hypothesis is tested using the
methodology by Andrews and Kim (2006), which allows us to test for a structural break at
the end of the observation period, where the Maastricht ﬁscal rule came into force (contrary
to usual Chow-type tests, which are only useful if the amount of observations before and
after the break is large enough).4 If a break exists, we calculate the Λ1 and Λ2 pre- and
2Detailed results from the FM-OLS estimation are available upon request.
3Results from the VAR estimations are available upon request.
4Andrews and Kim (2006) propose the post-break sum of squared residuals computed with an estimator
of the cointegration parameters for data up to the break as a test statistic. The critical values of this test
statistic can then be approximated by parametric subsampling. Given that the date of the break is not
determined a priori, we estimate the p-values (which correspond to the test statistic Pb in Andrews and
Kim, 2006) for the null of no break in the cointegration relationship from 2004 to 2007 (except for Bulgaria
and Romania which entered the EU as of 2007), where the break should have occurred.
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post break values and test for the validity of the TSH before and after the potential break,
rewriting (6) as
Xt = (A1 + A2I (t > T∗))Xt−1 + εt (10)
where T∗ will be set equal to the ﬁrst year for which the Pb test rejects stability at a 5%
signiﬁcance level. I( ) is a Heavyside function, taking value one if the argument is true, and
zero otherwise. The results show that the null of no cointegration breakdown is rejected
only for Cyprus (with 2004 as the ﬁrst year of this break), the Wald test indicates that the
TSH is not rejected before but rejected after the break, i.e. tax smoothing may indeed have
been inhibited by the Maastricht ﬁscal rule.5 Overall, however, the results imply that the
introduction of the Maastricht rule had only a small eﬀect on the validity of the TSH.
4 Conclusions
This piece of research presents evidence concerning the tax smoothing hypothesis (TSH) for
the New Member States of the European Union. We hypothesized that the introduction of
the 3%-deﬁcit rule may have resulted in welfare losses since these countries are no longer
capable of smoothing taxes as much as they want. Our basic estimations show that the TSH
cannot be rejected for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
When we test for a structural break which may have occurred due to the introduction of
the Maastricht rule, we ﬁnd that only Cyprus exhibits a break (with an associated change
in the validity of the TSH), which implies that the introduction of this rule has had only a
small eﬀect on the relevance of the TSH.
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Table 1: DF- and Granger causality Tests
Country gtot
t τ t balsm
t ∆gtot
t ∆τ t tng
Bulgaria -1.49 -1.39 -2.83 ∗∗∗ -2.72 ∗∗∗ -2.23 ∗∗∗ 7.80 ∗∗∗
Cyprus 1.32 3.12 -3.87 ∗∗∗ -2.79 ∗∗∗ -6.39 ∗∗∗ 8.54 ∗∗∗
Czech Rep 0.01 1.02 -2.10 ∗∗∗ -4.21 ∗∗∗ -4.55 ∗∗∗ 3.87 ∗∗
Estonia -2.77 ∗∗∗ -0.69 — -3.01 ∗∗∗ -3.36 ∗∗∗ 5.63 ∗∗∗
Hungary 0.37 0.22 -1.93 ∗∗ -3.96 ∗∗∗ -3.13 ∗∗∗ 3.47 ∗∗∗
Latvia -0.67 0.06 -4.29 ∗∗ -4.22 ∗∗∗ -4.17 ∗∗∗ 1.38
Lithuania -1.78 ∗ 0.99 -2.33 ∗∗∗ -4.04 ∗∗∗ -3.10 ∗∗∗ 11.03 ∗∗∗
Malta 0.18 1.25 -1.25 -2.96 ∗∗∗ -1.93 ∗∗ 1.14
Poland -0.27 0.12 -3.80 ∗∗∗ -2.46 ∗∗∗ -2.97 ∗∗∗ 5.82 ∗∗∗
Romania -0.29 -1.28 -4.09 ∗∗∗ -5.08 ∗∗∗ -8.59 ∗∗∗ 13.53 ∗∗∗
Slovak Rep -2.43 ∗∗∗ -1.25 — -2.91 ∗∗∗ -5.13 ∗∗∗ 7.69 ∗∗∗
Slovenia -2.30 ∗∗∗ -2.75 ∗∗∗ — -2.80 ∗∗∗ -3.96 ∗∗∗ 1.81
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] indicates rejection at the 1% (5%) [10%] level of signiﬁcance; balsm
t is calculated as the residuals
of the cointegration equation (4), tng is the test statistic for the null that balsm
t−1 non Granger-causes ∆gt.
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Table 2: Estimated Λ1 and Λ2 coeﬃcients
Country ￿ Λ1 ￿ Λ2 Wald test break
Bulgaria 1.32 (1.03) 3.66 (2.56) 11.97 ∗∗∗ —
Cyprus 0.47 (0.48) 0.59 (0.32) 5.59 ∗∗ 2004
Czech Rep 0.15 (0.32) 0.69 (0.60) 0.30 —
Hungary -0.08 (0.33) 1.12 (0.55) 0.08 —
Lithuania 0.12 (0.45) 2.00 (1.37) 1.93 —
Poland -0.10 (0.33) 0.71 (0.18) 1.90 —
Romania 0.54 (0.97) 1.39 (1.00) 0.77 —
Notes: The coeﬃcients ￿ Λ1 and ￿ Λ2 are the estimated parameters from equation (8) and the numbers in
parenthesis are the associated standard errors (calculated as described in Ghosh, 1995). The Wald test
statistic (distributed as χ2
2) tests whether the estimated VAR-coeﬃcients satisfy the restrictions given by
(9).
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Figure 1: Actual and optimal budget balances
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